How Loxley AI handles member wallets: in-chat wallet creation, envelope-encrypted key storage, operator-blind custody boundaries, signing inside the execution pipeline only, and withdrawal guarantees.
Telegram trading bots are custodial by design: instant execution requires keys the engine can sign with. That makes the custody layer the highest-stakes component in the stack. This document specifies how Loxley AI creates, stores and uses member wallet keys.
Each member creates an embedded wallet inside the Telegram bot chatflow. The wallet address appears immediately for funding; the member can also export their key material through the bot's own secure flow. A member who can export holds their own destiny — that is the point.
Private keys are stored encrypted at rest using envelope encryption — the data key is distinct from the master key, the master key is an environment secret never written to disk or database, and database contents alone are useless to an attacker. Frontend processes never see plaintext keys; only the coordinator tier decrypts, and only at signing time inside the execution pipeline.
For white-label operators this matters most: operators cannot read member keys. Not in the dashboard, not in exports, not "for support". The operator configures the brand and the fee wallet — custody stays inside the platform boundary. Your members' funds cannot become your temptation or your breach liability.
Members can withdraw their full balance at any time through the bot. A custodial system without a frictionless exit is a vault with someone else's name on the door; we treat withdrawal as a core flow, tested like execution.
Trade with a purpose-funded wallet, not life savings. Export and back up keys if you want self-custody redundancy. And never give a seed phrase to anyone claiming to be support — at Loxley or anywhere else. Not financial advice.
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